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The scholarship on late Imperial Russia’s 
Oriental studies is divided by a disagree-
ment over the applicability of Edward 
Said’s Orientalism to the Russian case. 
Moreover, in a broader sense, since the 
mid 1990s, Western scholarship has not 
been unanimous on the applicability of 
the underlying Foucauldian notions to 
late Imperial and Soviet Russia. While pre-
senting a systematic study of Soviet and 
post-Soviet scholarship (mostly unfamiliar 
to Western readership), this article offers 
an assessment of the institutional and in-
dividual practices adopted within Russia’s 
Oriental studies from the late nineteenth 
century to the present. The article aims to 
provide an analysis that goes far beyond 
the Saidian restrictive East-West dichoto-
my and his concept of two-vector relations 
between knowledge and state power. It 
offers a new reading, based on the decon-
struction of the interplay of the manifold 
multi-vector power/knowledge relations 
that is clearly identifiable in Russia’s long 
twentieth-century Iranian studies.1
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Russia and the Foucauldian
In today’s social sciences and humani-
ties, few scholars, if any, would deny that 
there is a strong correlation between 
scholarly knowledge and the social con-
text within which this knowledge is pro-
duced. However, in Europe, the scholarly 
contemplation of this topic dates back to 
the end of the nineteenth and the begin-
ning of the twentieth century—the period 
of the genesis of various social theories 
and the beginning of scholarly attempts 
at conceptualizing the nation-state. Natu-
rally, while these developments shared a 
number of common features that were 
the same across all the Western coun-
tries in which they occurred, there were 
also marked differences and characteris-
tics that were specific for each individual 
country. In this regard, Russia, which had 
always been distinct from both Europe 
and Asia, is a case in point (Hirsch 25-30, 
44; Gerasimov and Kusber 3-23, 229-72; 
Vucinich xiv, 5-14, 30-34; Slezkine 388-
90; Krementsov 13-16). 
The issue of distinctions in possible 
modes of social development directly in-
fluencing all other spheres within differ-
ent nation states was also considered by 
Russia’s intellectuals at the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth century. A good illustration of 
this can be found in the words of Bogdan 
Kistiakovskii, a renowned social philoso-
pher and legal scholar of Ukranian orgin 
in late Imperial Russia, who had stated as 
early as 1909: 
There are no same unified ideas of 
personal freedom, of legal system, 
61
individuals, institutions and 
discourses: Knowledge and Power  
in russia’s iranian Studies of the  




Middle East – Topics & Arguments #04–2015
62
of constitutional state, identical for all 
peoples and times, just as there is no 
capitalism or any other economic or 
social order identical for all countries. 
All legal ideas acquire unique color-
ation and their own tinge in the con-
sciousness of each separate people. 
(Author’s translation)
However, against the backdrop of various 
kinds of national specificities, there were 
common general tendencies and factors, 
namely at the social, economic and po-
litical levels, in all Western societies which 
were considered by many historians to 
be major influences on science and 
scholarly knowledge and their develop-
ment (Graham 1; Tolz 6; Hirsch 25-30; 
Beer 3-8; Slezkine 388-90; Krementsov 
13-16; Kotkin 14, 21-23). These general 
tendencies and factors were clearly ap-
parent in Russia throughout her long 
twentieth century.2
Generally, twentieth-century European 
thought witnessed major international 
debates on the philosophy and social his-
tory of scientific and scholarly knowledge. 
Since the beginning of the century, hu-
manities scholars studying the history and 
present of science, and scientists them-
selves, particularly in those countries 
which were in the vanguard of the rapid 
development of science, had been pay-
ing further attention to questions such as 
the social effects of this process on societ-
ies, the role that science and scholarly 
knowledge play for a particular country or 
a society, and for mankind in general. In 
the second half of the twentieth century, 
the issue of the relationship between sci-
entific and scholarly inquiry and their so-
cial context and, especially, the role of 
state power in this relationship became 
the subject of the scrutiny of social phi-
losophers and historians. They also pon-
dered the question of the place of scien-
tists and scholars in the complex and 
entangled grid of multi-branch reciprocal 
influence between individuals and vari-
ous forms of knowledge, social institu-
tions and state power.3
Among them, Michel Foucault’s (1926-
1984) work is of particular interest. His 
ideas on power relations within the pow-
er/knowledge nexus, the notions of 
épistème and discourse deeply influenc-
ing the process of scientific/scholarly 
knowledge production and perception of 
various truths by society, the role of intel-
lectuals and the phenomenon of resis-
tance are the most pertinent to the subject 
of this study.4 Foucault’s work is character-
ized by a high level of inherent inconsis-
tency and a lack of theoretical totality and 
cohesion, but especially by its iconoclastic 
and challenging nature. However, what 
goes without saying is that 
his influence is clear in a great deal of 
post-structuralist, post-modernist, fem-
inist, post-Marxist and post-colonial 
theorizing. The impact of his work has 
also been felt across a wide range of 
disciplinary fields, from sociology and 
anthropology to English studies and 
history (Mills 1).
Foucault’s concepts of power, knowledge 
and discourse caused heated debates in 
the 1960s and 1970s and had a consider-
able impact on the further development 
of critical thinking at the end of the twen-
tieth and at the beginning of the twenty-
first century. Among Foucault’s main con-
cepts, his insistence on the absence of an 
absolute and pure truth is most notewor-
thy. Taking an approach to the study of 
the production of knowledge that he 
conceives of as archaeology,5 he argued 
that the process of striving for ultimate 
truths through conventional scholarly ac-
tivities throughout the course of human 
history had always been subject to the 
influence of a vast range of factors, which 
led him to conclude that all truths are 
conceived or, to be more precise, con-
structed rather than being absolute and 
ultimate. Therefore, according to Fou-
cault, there are no objective, constant 
and independent truths within the system 
of human knowledge, especially in the 
human and social sciences.
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This inherent feature of human knowledge 
is reckoned by Foucault as the conse-
quence of the constant interplay of power 
relations comprising the various compo-
nents and factors of both those on the 
highest level of structures organizing hu-
man societies (for instance, state power, 
social and cultural structures, academic 
and other communities) and those of less 
complexity (relations between individuals, 
their personal viewpoints, endeavors, pas-
sions). All these shaped or indeed con-
structed knowledge, which therefore can-
not be considered truly impartial, constant 
and objective (Mills 33-42, 48-52).
Hence, another crucial Foucauldian no-
tion, namely ‘governmentality’ that deals 
with “the technologies of domination of 
others and those of the self” (Foucault, 
“Technologies of the Self” 19). It demon-
strates the tight interconnections and rela-
tionships between power exercised to-
wards individuals by institutions or a state 
and that which is exercised by individuals 
towards themselves. These processes im-
ply interaction between aspects of politics 
and human ethics. There are conduct reg-
ulation rules and techniques in our society 
that are designed and applied from the 
top, but, simultaneously, there are also 
rules and techniques exercised by indi-
viduals in order to control and arrange 
their own conduct, and they are tightly en-
tangled with each other (Simons 36-41; 
Mills 42-52; Kotkin 21-23).
Notwithstanding the seeming universali-
ty of these theoretical notions, it must be 
noted that their applicability to the analy-
sis of late Imperial and Soviet Russia has 
been questioned since Foucault arrived 
at his conclusions through the study of 
the late European juridical monarchies 
and liberal states, a grouping to which 
Russia arguably did not belong.6 The very 
applicability of the Foucauldian to Russia, 
in general, was questioned by such schol-
ars as Laura Engelstein in the 1990s. 
Moreover, somewhat overstating the Rus-
sian case’s “otherness,” Engelstein comes 
to conclusions which might also partially 
reflect a residual Cold War mentality. She 
emphasizes that Foucault stresses the un-
derlying difference between the so-
called Old Regimes, where the state is 
the sole source of power, and liberal so-
cieties in which power regulates activi-
ties, based on scientific/scholarly knowl-
edge, and is realized by means of 
disciplinary practices permeating society 
(Engelstein 224). She therefore con-
cludes on the Russian case that 
… [a]lthough Western culture pen-
etrated the empire’s official and civic 
elites, and the model of Western in-
stitutions to a large extent shaped the 
contours of state and social organi-
zation, the regime of “power/knowl-
edge” never came into its own in the 
Russian context (225).
It appears that Engelstein’s reasoning 
takes into consideration only the general 
organizational modes of modern Western 
society, as discussed by Foucault, and op-
erates with very narrow definitions of 
structures when exploring the applicabil-
ity of the power/knowledge nexus to Rus-
sia’s late imperial and Soviet societies. Her 
focus is on the outward appearance and 
the concrete shape of structures. Howev-
er, I would argue that what are really at 
stake here are not structures, but princi-
ples. Indeed, although Russia had consid-
erable distinctions from its Western con-
temporaries in terms of social organization, 
the principles according to which power 
relations operated and permeated the 
whole society were quite similar (Beer 
205-09; Kotkin 21-23).
Indeed, more recently scholars have ar-
gued convincingly in favor of the Foucaul-
dian approach to the study of Russian his-
tory emphasizing the universality of 
Foucault’s thoughts on power relations.7 
Drawing on the insights provided by 
these scholars, the theoretical framework 
of this article will be informed by the 
above-mentioned Foucauldian notions. 
While surveying the main common fea-
tures and distinctions of the process of 
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Orientological knowledge production 
during the above-mentioned historical 
periods, I will trace the presence of Fou-
cauldian power relations in the context of 
Russian society of the time. As a subaltern 
outcome, certain parallels of the same in-
terplay of power/knowledge relations will 
be drawn within present-day Russia’s 
Iranology. Thus, I will demonstrate the va-
lidity of Foucault’s relevant concepts for 
the student of Russian history.
From Persian Studies to Iranology
The involvement of Russia’s Orientolo-
gists8 in the intense manifold interactions 
between the Russian Empire and Persia 
during the period from the late nine-
teenth century to 1917 predominantly took 
place within the main four professional 
domains, namely academic scholarship, 
the military, diplomatic service and the 
Orthodox Church’s missionary activities. 
Given the nature and the historical devel-
opments of this interaction, the extent of 
the involvement of each domain in ques-
tion was different, as was their impact on 
Russo-Persian relations of the period (Vi-
gasin and Khokhlov 7-8). However, there 
were also well-discernible commonalities 
in the organizational set-up and practices 
of these domains as well as in the roles of 
individuals involved in the activities of 
these domains, namely academic schol-
ars and practical experts of Persian stud-
ies. In addition, despite the great system-
ic shift, which took place in 1917 and led to 
sequential significant changes in all 
spheres of the life of Russian society, there 
were strong continuities on the structural 
level of early Soviet Oriental studies and 
also in discourses, which were wide-
spread among the Orientologists of a 
new generation.
The issue of the formation of Russia’s Ori-
ental studies after 1917 was initially dealt 
with in the works of Muriel Atkin, Nina 
Kuznetsova, Wayne S. Vucinich, Semen 
Agaev and Richard Frye. They all empha-
sized the mainly new, different from late 
Imperial, nature of early Soviet Oriental 
studies, particularly on the institutional 
level (Atkin; Kuznetsova and Kulagina; Vu-
cinich; Agaev; Frye). For example, Atkin 
ascribed the establishment of Oriental 
studies in Central Asia to the Bolshevik re-
gime (229). Later, the scholarship repre-
sented by Marshall, Schimmelpenninck, 
Tolz and Kemper argued in favor of the 
presence of strong organizational conti-
nuities throughout all the Soviet Oriental 
studies of the 1920s-30s. This has also 
been supported by the archival docu-
ments only recently brought into scholarly 
circulation (Volkov, “Persian Studies and 
the Military”). They shed light on the insti-
tutional activities of the War Ministry re-
garding the establishment of Oriental 
studies on the periphery of the Russian 
Empire at the turn of the twentieth century. 
For example, the successful initiative of 
Staff-Captain Ivan Iagello (1865-1942) 
aimed at the creation of the courses of 
Urdu, Arabic and Persian in Turkestan 
dates back as early as 1897. In 1908, the 
courses evolved into a full-scale Officers’ 
School of Oriental Languages in Tashkent, 
where history, geography and Islamic law 
were also taught (Oriental Studies and 
Foreign Policy).
The publication of the works by Schimmel-
penninck, Tolz and Kemper also resurrect-
ed the slightly outdated debate on the ap-
plicability of Edward Said’s Orientalism 
concept to the Russian case, which had 
been initiated by Nathaniel Knight, Adeeb 
Khalid and Maria Todorova at the turn of 
this century (Knight, “Grigor’ev,” “On Rus-
sian Orientalism;” Khalid; Todorova; 
Schimmelpenninck, “The Imperial Roots;” 
Andreeva; Bartol’d, “Istoria izucheniia 
Vostoka,” “Vostok i russkaia”). Unfortunate-
ly, the above-mentioned debate failed to 
break through the bounds of the Saidian 
two-vector relations of “the complicity of 
knowledge with imperial power,” whereas 
the scholarship of Tolz, Schimmelpen-
ninck and Kemper succeeded in qualita-
tively transforming the debate into a 
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broader debate on Russian Orientalism, 
engaging with Foucault’s genuine notions 
of the productive interplay of power/
knowledge multi-vector relations between 
individuals, institutions, state and dis-
courses (Tolz; Schimmelpenninck, Russian 
Orientalism; Kemper; Marshall; Volkov, 
“Persian Studies and the Military”).
The study of the late Imperial period dem-
onstrates that all four domains of Russia’s 
Oriental studies were organisationally de-
veloped enough and remarkably self-reli-
ant. At the same time, their organisational 
activities were deeply interconnected with 
each other and their institutional practices 
were much alike. This productive mutual 
interpenetration at the level of institutions 
and individuals which was inherent to all 
four domains is extremely illustrative of 
the presence of power/knowledge rela-
tions (Volkov, “Persian Studies and the Mil-
itary” 932). Based on the character of Rus-
sia’s presence in Persia during the late 
Imperial period, it appears that the above-
mentioned state of affairs within the four-
domain structure becomes particularly 
clear when studying the example of Per-
sian studies. In the case of the diplomatic 
and military domains, this can be support-
ed by the scholarly and professional ac-
tivities of such individuals as Gamazov, 
Zinoviev, Minorsky and Tumanskii, Iagello, 
Smirnov, Snesarev, accordingly. The mis-
sionary domain is evidenced by the activ-
ities of the Russian Orthodox Orumie Mis-
sion and the Russian Orthodox 
ministers-Orientologists Ilminskii, Masha-
nov and Ostroumov. The forth (academic) 
domain of late Imperial Persian studies is 
represented by the scholars of world 
fame, such as Zhukovskii, Bartol’d, Zarud-
nyi and others.9
Considering the Soviet Oriental studies of 
the 1920s-1930s, it is possible to conclude 
that they kept the overall pre-revolution 
organizational structure, with the under-
standable exception of the missionary do-
main. The demise of this domain was pre-
determined by the militantly atheistic 
nature of the Bolshevik ideology and was 
stipulated by Article 15 of the Russo-Per-
sian Treaty of Friendship, according to 
which Soviet Russia repudiated all Russian 
Church property in Persia in 1921 and 
pledged not to undertake similar activities 
henceforward.10 However, in actual fact, 
the once powerful presence of the Russian 
Orthodox Church in Persia had ceased to 
exist by 1918 because of the hostilities in 
the West and North-West of Persia and the 
eventual devastation of the Orumie Mis-
sion by Turks and Kurds.11 
Simultaneously, judging by the immense-
ly high activity of the Soviet-Iranian trade 
relations during the 1920s and the first 
half of the 1930s, the strong emphasis of 
Soviet foreign policy on the development 
of economic and trade ties with Iran, and 
the contribution of Soviet trade represen-
tations of the time to the accumulation of 
Orientological knowledge on Persia, the 
trade domain could have supplemented 
the remaining three domains of early So-
viet Persian studies.12 However, given the 
fact that the personnel of Soviet trade rep-
resentations, as a rule, consisted mainly 
of experts, assigned from Narkomindel, 
Razvedupr and INO OGPU,13 the trade 
activities with their organizations, person-
nel and practices cannot be marked out 
as an institutionally self-reliant domain 
of Oriental studies.14 Therefore, during 
the early Soviet period, Persian studies, 
or Iranology, was predominantly repre-
sented by the academic, diplomatic and 
military domains. 
Taking into account that “[i]n the early 
years of its existence, the Soviet regime 
perceived a need for people with area ex-
pertise to work in the government, party, 
and military in Asian regions of the country 
and to advance Soviet interests elsewhere 
in Asia” (Atkin 229), the emphasis of Ori-
entological training radically changed. 
Stressing the crucial importance of the 
practical usefulness of Oriental studies to 
state needs, the Bolsheviks replaced the 
former emphasis on gathering linguistic, 
ethnographic and cultural information for 
FoCUs
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #04–2015
66
the study of Persia with enhanced political 
and, particularly, economic components. 
Though, similarly to the late Imperial pe-
riod, academic Oriental training was 
shared by all domains, this time, it was the 
Military Academy of the Red Army of 
Workers and Peasants that played the 
leading role in the Oriental training of 
practical experts on Persia during the 
1920s, contrary to the former leading role 
of Russia’s Imperial Ministry for Foreign Af-
fairs in this field.15
The study of the late imperial period also 
demonstrates that the eventual produc-
tion of knowledge within Persian studies 
greatly benefited from the tight individu-
al and organisational interrelationship 
between all four domains of Russia’s Ori-
ental studies. As is clear from the re-
search, scholarly active diplomats and 
military officers used their professional 
postings for obtaining new area-study 
material and made immensely significant 
contributions to the activities of various 
Orientological societies, members of 
which they were. On the other hand, the 
main Russian scholars of Persian Studies 
played the underlying role in the Orien-
tological training of officers and often car-
ried out the narrowly specified assign-
ments of their diplomatic and military 
colleagues during their scholarly mis-
sions to Persia.16 The same interrelation-
ship was inherited by the Persian studies 
of the early Soviet period. Konstantin 
Chaikin17 taught Persian to Yakov Bliumkin 
at the Military Academy of the Red Army 
of Workers and Peasants, founded by the 
former Tsarist Lieutenant-General Andrey 
Snesarev.18 In 1920, although simply for 
the sake of surviving, the former Tsarist 
Colonel Ivan Iagello, a specialist in Per-
sian and Urdu and the founder of the 
Tashkent Officers’ School of Oriental Lan-
guages, accepted Frunze’s invitation to 
restore and to again take the lead of Ori-
ental studies in Tashkent (Lunin 111-13).
Furthermore, during the 1920s and the 
early 1930s the scholars of the so-called 
new “practical” school of Persian studies 
were enthusiastically involved in both the 
activities of the Commissariat for Foreign 
Affairs and the academic and scholarly ac-
tivities related to Persian studies. This pe-
riod in the whole history of Russia’s Orien-
tal studies can rightfully be regarded as 
the most straightforward illustration of the 
amalgamation of scholarly knowledge 
and state power, hence, the supreme 
manifestation of Said’s Orientalism.19 In 
1926, during one of the sessions of the 
Party Central Committee, Georgii 
Chicherin was accused of losing control 
over Persian affairs, and that even the gen-
eral guidelines of the Soviet Eastern policy 
had been shaped by his employees, 
namely Pastukhov, Osetrov and Gurko-
Kriazhin—the leading Iranists of the new 
generation.20
The study of the late Imperial period has 
also revealed the presence of an under-
lying discourse throughout all Persian 
studies. All four domains were rather 
united in the promotion of Russkoe delo 
(“The Russian Cause”), which also in-
cluded the notion of the Russian civiliz-
ing mission in the Orient. The spirit of pa-
triotism, boiled down to the promotion 
of imperial Russia’s state interests and 
Russian culture in Persia, was generally 
inherent to the activities of all domains. 
Notwithstanding the fact that all this was 
taking place in the context of the intense 
rivalry with European powers, the con-
ception of a civilizing mission was solid-
ly based on Russia’s sense of superiority 
towards Asians that was caused by their 
perceived belonging to the so-called Eu-
ropean civilization. However, simultane-
ously, most late Imperial Russia’s Orien-
tologists strongly believed in the greater 
capability of Russian culture, in contrast 
to the West, to interact with the Orient 
because of Russia’s geographical and 
cultural immediate proximity to the lat-
ter.21 As was first emphasized by Knight, 
such discursive manifestations were 
particularly widespread within the aca-
demic domain of late Imperial Oriental 
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studies and were passed on to their dis-
ciples in diplomatic and military services 
(“Grigor’ev” 81; Tolz).
Discourses of a similar nature were also 
inherent to Oriental studies of Soviet Rus-
sia. The representatives of the new Orien-
tological school continued to look down 
on Persia, this time because of the fact that 
Russia became the first society of the vic-
torious socialist revolution in the whole 
world. Hence, the civilizing mission was 
replaced by the proliferation of socialist 
revolution.22 The developments of 1919-
1920 in Europe and the Orient, including 
the failed attempt to sovietize Persia, led 
to the conclusion that Persian and other 
eastern societies had not sufficiently de-
veloped and were not ready for an imme-
diate revolution.23 So, the above-men-
tioned discourse transformed into the 
belief in the necessity of a significantly 
more protracted process of cultivating 
Persians for social conversion. Both dis-
courses predetermined that the agents of 
the Bolshevism Cause with relevant Orien-
tological expertise and, hence, a better 
understanding of the oppressed Orien-
tals, be trained in required quantities.24 In 
addition to the Oriental section of the Mil-
itary Academy, this goal was also pursued 
by the foundation of the Communist Uni-
versity of the Toilers of the East in Moscow, 
which preferred to accept students from 
among the most deprived, illiterate Asians, 
with the aim of nurturing efficient experts 
and practically useful scholars.25 
In actual fact, this motion was the industri-
alized development of what had initially 
been offered by Vasilii Grigorie’v long be-
fore—as early as the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury (Knight, “Grigor’ev” 95-97)—and trans-
ferred to the Bolsheviks through Viktor 
Rozen’s disciples, academicians of Orien-
tal studies Vasilii Bartol’d and Sergei 
Ol’denburg, deeply involved with the ear-
ly Soviet nationalities’ policy (Tolz 3-4, 
7-19).26 So, the massive engagement of all 
three Orientological domains with native 
agents became one of the most character-
istic features of the Soviet period that orig-
inally derived from late Imperial Russia. In 
support of further refutation of the univer-
sality of Said’s Orientalism that was so ad-
vocated by Khalid, the above-mentioned 
interplay of power/knowledge relations 
proves that the Russian/Soviet case was 
devoid of any racist component whatso-
ever. It is also maintained by Vladimir Mi-
norskii’s private diaries, dated from the 
time he was Head of the Russo-Brito-
Turko-Persian Quadripartite Commission 
for the demarcation of Persia’s western 
border in 1913.27 Furthermore, and most 
important, the above-depicted interplay 
supports the presence of one of the fun-
damental elements of Foucault’s power/
knowledge relations, namely their ‘pro-
ductivity’ (Foucault, “Truth and Power” 113-
14, 120; “Prison Talk” 52; Mills 33; Tolz 70; 
Volkov, “Persian Studies and the Military” 
932).
Along with that, after 1917, the new politi-
cal ideology predetermined the creation 
of a new discourse, which seriously affect-
ed the relationships between main com-
ponents of the Foucauldian power grid—
academic and expert knowledge, state, 
institutions and individuals. This implied 
the making of practical use of Oriental 
studies—the discourse which challenged 
the very right of physical existence for 
scholarship that was unable to yield im-
mediate practical returns (Kemper 2-3; Ro-
dionov 47, 51-52). The expert Persian 
scholarship of Pavlovich, Pastukhov, Ose-
trov and Gurko-Kriazhin not only crucially 
affected the activities of early Soviet diplo-
macy and the military towards Persia but 
also put aside the still-existing classic 
scholarship of Persian studies, which had 
been influencing Russia’s foreign policy 
towards Persia since before 1917, albeit in-
directly but rather successfully. However, 
this state of affairs in Persian studies lasted 
merely until the mid-1930s, by which time 
almost all the representatives of the “old 
school” and of revolutionary expertdom 
(practical Orientologists of the first wave) 
had either died from natural causes or 
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been dismissed from their posts and ex-
ecuted during Stalin’s purges. By that time, 
the academic domain had been staffed 
with the graduates of newly established 
institutions and, in general, the interaction 
between the domains had significantly di-
minished (Tolz 6).28
‘Governmentality’ and Intellectuals
Given the hampered access to the archival 
documents of later periods in Russia, 
which has become even more restricted 
since 2000, the study of the mature Soviet 
period has had to confine itself to merely 
the analysis of published works. Another 
reason for this is the much deeper profes-
sional specialization of practical domains 
that has not allowed diplomats and mili-
tary officers to have enough time for schol-
arly research since the 1930s, and the area-
study information professionally produced 
by them has not been allowed into the 
academic domain, either. On top of that, 
the level of their academic Orientological 
training could not be compared to that of 
the pre-1917 period, and very few people 
would come into academia after their re-
tirement from military or diplomatic ser-
vice. Therefore, the study of the main 
scholarly works, published only within the 
academic domain after the 1930s, is quite 
representative of Soviet and post-Soviet 
Oriental studies as a whole.
After the understandable slack of 1940s-
50s in the activities of Oriental studies, it 
is possible to discern a period from 1960 
to the mid-1980s when Soviet Iranology 
turned into a monotonous uniform schol-
arship in full conformity with the Commu-
nist Party’s ideology. In view of the above 
and given the self-censorship of that time, 
inculcated from the top, the works by Iva-
nov, Kuznetsova, Kulagina and Agaev 
were overwhelmed with relevant ideolog-
ical underpinnings and are lacking in 
analysis (Kuznetsova and Kulagina; 
Agaev). For example, one of the central 
figures of the Soviet Iranology of the time, 
Mikhail Ivanov (1909-1986), focused on 
the Iranian “anti-feudal” movements of 
the nineteenth century and the Iranian 
revolution of 1905-1911, heavily drawing 
on Vladimir Ulianov-Lenin’s writings (M. 
Ivanov, Iranskaia revoliutsiia; “Sozyv per-
vogo iranskogo;” Antifeodal’nye). During 
the 1950s to 1980s, he also occupied key 
administrative positions, including Head 
of the Leningrad Institute of History of the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences and Head of 
the Moscow State Institute of Internation-
al Relations affiliated with the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of the USSR.29 
In 1970, Nina Kuznetsova and Liudmila Ku-
lagina published a very detailed study Iz 
istorii sovetskogo vostokovedeniia (“Of 
the History of Soviet Oriental Studies”) 
which, however, almost did not engage 
with archival materials and was based to-
tally on Soviet secondary sources. Its em-
phasis on the development of Soviet Ori-
ental studies, and Iranology therein, in 
strict accordance with the Party resolutions 
and the government decrees as well as on 
its “Marxist-Leninist foundations” (35) sig-
nificantly reduces its historiographical val-
ue. However, due to its scrupulous, some-
times mechanical description of the 
events, this study still remains one of the 
main references regarding the organisa-
tional changes of Soviet Oriental studies. 
It therefore can be concluded that know-
ing the social and political conditions of 
the time in which they were written, the 
works of this period, nevertheless, are to 
be studied as scholarly valuable sources 
of factual historical material. For example, 
Ivanov’s works extensively drew on archi-
val materials, since the author’s adminis-
trative positions, deeply embedded into 
Soviet science bureaucracy and party 
structures, granted him additional unre-
stricted access to the archives of the So-
viet foreign affairs entities, hence securing 
more operational autonomy for him.
The developments in the political and so-
cial life of the Soviet Union in the late 
1980s opened more archival documents 
even for the Soviet researchers with a less-
er operational autonomy and allowed for 
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new approaches in their study (Mamedo-
va, “O nekotorykh” 40-41). For Soviet 
Iranology, this moment was marked by the 
publication in 1988 of collected archival 
materials on the modern history of Iran. 
The collection, called Novaia istoriia Irana 
(“Modern History of Iran”), was edited by 
Ninel’ Belova and other renowned Soviet 
Iranists. It contained a new portion of pre-
viously intact documents which had been 
spotted in the Soviet archives, including 
the one of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
which became slightly more open during 
Gorbachev’s proclaimed policy of glas-
nost. As if pushing forward the official au-
thorities, the editors remarked that “the 
collection of documents that would repre-
sent the whole period of the modern his-
tory of Iran had been published neither in 
the USSR nor out of its borders. However, 
the need in this kind of edition [was] im-
mensely great” (3). The edition still bore 
the imprint of ideological self-censorship, 
although to a considerably lesser extent 
compared with previous works. 
However, it was the work of Moisei Pers-
its which was truly groundbreaking; this 
work was based on the declassified ar-
chives mainly of the Comintern and saw 
the publication of two series in the 1990s. 
The author gave a really symbolic name 
to his book: Zastenchivaia interventsiia: 
O sovetskom vtorzhenii v Iran i Bukharu 
v 1920-1921 godu (“The Timid Interven-
tion: The Soviet Invasion of Iran and 
Bukhara, 1920-1921”). The word zas-
tenchivaia (“timid”) symbolically bridged 
the reticent and uncertain nature of the 
Bolsheviks’ attempt to sovietize Persia in 
1917-1921 and the state’s efforts, aimed at 
suppressing the matter within Soviet his-
toriography.30 As the current hampered 
research into this and other similar issues 
in Russian archives illustrates, present-
day Russia’s authorities resumed the So-
viet discursive practices of the politics of 
history in the early 2000s.31
In this sense, the works by Vladimir Genis 
became a logical and timely continuation 
of Persits’ initiative, based on the access 
to the documents, opened in the 1990s, 
shedding light on the early Soviet policy 
towards Persia, Afghanistan and Central 
Asia. Genis’ books, in detail and for the 
first time in Russian historiography, high-
lighted such topics as: the role of Bolshe-
viks in the establishment of the Gilan So-
cialist Republic and the winding-up of this 
abortive enterprise; the destiny of the first 
Soviet plenipotentiary to Persia and Af-
ghanistan, Nikolai Bravin, and the Soviet 
politics of history around him, still sup-
ported by the Russian state establish-
ment; and, finally, the destiny of the Impe-
rial Russian diplomat-Orientologist Pavel 
Vvedenskii, whose expertise as a scholar 
was used by the Bolsheviks in a classical 
discursive mode à la Foucault while he 
was imprisoned. On balance, Genis’ 
scholarship can be distinguished by the 
scrupulous saturation of previously re-
stricted archival materials and is im-
mensely valuable for researchers in terms 
of guiding them towards new, unconven-
tional for present-day Russia’s historiogra-
phy, areas of research (Genis, Krasnaia 
Persiia; Nevernye slugi rezhima; Vitse-
Konsul Vvedenskii).32
It is also worth noting that the 1990s’ rela-
tive openness of Russian archives was 
hardly asked-for by Russia’s mainstream 
historians of Iran, who are mostly based in 
or around the Moscow Institute of Oriental 
Studies of Russia’s Academy of Sciences. 
They concentrate their scholarship on tra-
ditional, mainly Soviet, perceptions of Rus-
sian-Iranian relations, while trying to avoid 
topics leading to the negative interpreta-
tion of Russian/Soviet impact on Iran. Their 
analysis of historical and contemporary 
developments mainly moves in full confor-
mity with Russia’s foreign policy priorities. 
It could be supported by such works as 
Granitsa Rossii s Iranom: Istoriia formirova-
niia (“Russia’s Border with Iran: The History 
of Shaping”) by Liudmila Kulagina and 
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Elena Dunaeva; “Operatsiia ‘Sochustvie’ i 
reaktsiia na nee presidenta Ahmadinezha-
da cherez 70 let” (“Operation ‘Sympathy’ 
and the President Ahmadinejad’s Reaction 
towards It after 70 Years”) by Vladimir 
Sazhin; and “Russo-Iranian Political Rela-
tions in the First Decade of the Twenty-
First Century” by Elena Dunaeva.
The first one became a factual response 
to the Iranian old public discourse, ques-
tioning the legitimacy of the Golestan 
and Turkmenchay peace treaties, and, on 
top of that, it appeared at the time when 
Russia came across serious difficulties 
during the negotiations with Iran on the 
delimitation of the Caspian Sea (Dunaeva, 
“Formirovanie granitsy” 63, 75, 77-88; 
“Kaspiiskaia diplomatiia Moskvy” 66-77). 
It is noteworthy that the work begins with 
a thesis reflecting the widespread dis-
course within Russian historiography that 
the territorial gains of Russia in Trans-
Caucasus and Central Asia took place as 
a result of the ‘voluntary entry’ of those 
areas to the Russian Empire (Kulagina 
and Dunaeva 5).
The second one was published shortly af-
ter Iran’s former President had tried to ini-
tiate a discourse on Iran’s integral right to 
claim reparations for the country’s occu-
pation by the allied forces during WWII. 
The author put forward an argument on 
the legally substantiated legitimacy of the 
Soviet occupation of Iran, contrary to 
those of Great Britain and the United 
States, and also for the profound histori-
cal benefits of this action for Iran (Sazhin, 
“Operatsiia ‘Sochuvstvie’” 145-51). 
The author then follows with a rather dubi-
ous formula holding that the occupation 
of Iran “secured its sovereignty and inde-
pendence as well as its decent place in the 
post-war world” (146). 
The third one can be regarded as an ar-
chetypal sample of Russia’s Foreign Af-
fairs’ propaganda on contemporary Rus-
sian-Iranian relations, albeit rather 
sophisticated and enshrined into a schol-
arly form. Having been written in the con-
text of the recent, most intense stage of 
the age-old triple interplay (the West-Iran-
Russia), the article was targeted at an Eng-
lish-language scholarly readership and 
championed the thesis of the mostly bilat-
eral productive nature of Russo-Iranian re-
lations during the last dozen years and 
their future great potential, both of which, 
I would argue, have simply never existed 
(Dunaeva, “Russo-Iranian Political Rela-
tions” 468-69).33 It is also noteworthy that 
the article draws solely on the sources of 
the state establishment of the two coun-
tries and avoids engaging with third-party 
views. Except for one book and three jour-
nalist articles in the very beginning as the 
proof of “many publications about Russo-
Iranian relations in the West,” the article 
does not contain a single reference to in-
dependent scholarly or media sources 
(443, 447-48, 452, 455). Not engaging 
with independent sources on Russian-Ira-
nian relations at all, and not bothering her-
self with too many references, in general, 
the author is content with emphatically re-
ferring to her counterparts on the Iranian 
side—certified “spokesmen” on Russia—
Mehdi Sanaie and Jahangir Karami, as well 
as to the representatives of Russia’s main-
stream Iranology. All this makes the lan-
guage of the article declarative and remi-
niscent of a foreign policy communiqué 
which can also be explained by relying 
almost totally on the official documents of 
Iranian state organizations and, particu-
larly, of Russia’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
and Russia’s President Office, the fact 
catching the eye even without a brief lan-
guage discourse analysis (444, 447-49, 
451-52, 454-57, 459-61, 465-68).
Notwithstanding the fact that some Rus-
sian Iranists themselves acknowledge that 
the development of present-day Russia’s 
Iranology has become a hostage of the 
triangle-shaped relations between the 
USA, Russia and Iran (Mamedova, “O 
nekotorykh” 43), such a state of affairs can-
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not be regarded as a support to the Said-
ian rather limited model of two-vector re-
lations between knowledge and state 
power. By no means I am arguing that the 
above-mentioned works were merely pro-
duced according to a straightforward 
state order, though for a significant num-
ber, that cannot be ruled out, either. Rath-
er, I would maintain that those works be-
came the organic brainchild of that 
interplay of power/knowledge relations 
which, in this particular case, is an interac-
tion of institutional and public discourses, 
knowledge, state power and ‘governmen-
tality’ (Simons 82; Mills 33, 58; Krementsov 
4-5, 29-30). In this sense, Persits, Genis and 
suchlike scholars,34 on the contrary, repre-
sent the examples of the Foucauldian in-
tellectual, breaking discursive institutional 
practices and overcoming ‘governmental-
ity’ (Simons 36-41; Kotkin 21-23).35 
Another manifestation of this interplay is 
the close interaction of various branches 
of Russia’s Iranology (the Academy of 
Sciences, universities, scholarly societies, 
etc.) with Iran’s political state structures. 
It is common knowledge that Russian sci-
entific and scholarly institutions have 
been seriously underfunded by the state 
since the 1990s. As Loren Graham states, 
“science never proceeds in a political 
and economic vacuum” (27), and, in the 
case of Russian Iranology, this vacuum in 
the Foucauldian power grid has been 
filled since the second half of the 1990s 
by the result of a thoughtful approach of 
the Iranian Embassy in Moscow and its 
sections in other cities. This is also point-
ed out in Mamedova’s insightful article, 
in actual fact, unintentionally demon-
strating that the Iranian government has 
virtually taken Russia’s Iranology on its 
payroll (“O nekotorykh” 41-42).
In addition to sponsoring the equipping 
of the so-called “Iranian closets” in Rus-
sian universities and institutes, enabling 
students and scholars to watch the broad-
casting of Iranian official channels, and 
providing a year abroad for Russian stu-
dents, as well as sponsoring Russian 
scholars’ trips to Iran, the Iranian Embassy 
has been actively participating in the 
scholarly activities of Russian Iranology in-
stitutions, including tangible assistance in 
organizing thematic conferences and 
publishing special editions on Iran and 
Iranian studies with the participation of 
Iranian “authorized” scholars. For in-
stance, the Russian-language works with 
the titles that speak for themselves, The 
Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran; The Islamic Revolution: 
Past, Present and Future; Iranology in 
Russia and Iranists; Iran: Islam and Power 
and The Thirtieth Anniversary of the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, have been pub-
lished only by virtue of Iran’s Embassy 
(42). It is also illustrative that some of the 
works have been co-edited by the head 
of Iran’s Islamic Culture and Relations Or-
ganization, Abuzar Ebrahimi Torkaman 
(Mamedova and Torkaman; Mamedova, 
Dvadtsat’ piat’ let Islamskoi; Mamedova 
and Sanai), and Iran’s current Ambassador 
to Russia, Mehdi Sanaei (an Iranian politi-
cian well known in relevant circles, an 
IRGC veteran of the Iran-Iraq war and a 
former cultural attaché of Iran’s Embassy 
in Moscow (1999-2003), he was a member 
of the Iranian Parliament’s National Secu-
rity and Foreign Policy Committee and 
head of the IRAS, the Institute of Iran-Eur-
asian Studies,the former Iranian Center 
for Russia, Central Asia and Caucasus 
Studies).36 It goes without saying that such 
a status quo inevitably tells upon the cho-
sen subject area and the content of pub-
lished articles and books on Iran which, 
thereafter, results in the acute scarcity of 
comprehensive scholarly analysis in pres-
ent-day Russia’s Iranology.
Seriously lacking in critical approach, the 
chapters of these edited collections put 
forward the overall positivist thesis regard-
ing the events of the modern and contem-
porary history in both countries and their 
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interaction. In so doing, some of them im-
plicitly (Fedorova 60-71; Polishuk 118-25; 
Kulagina and Akhmedov 116-27; Mamedo-
va, “O nekotorykh” 40-41)—others explic-
itly (Dunaeva, “Iran i Tsentral’naia Aziia” 
126-33; “Politicheskoe zaveshanie” 78-81; 
Kulagina 43-52; Sazhin, “Dialog tsivilizat-
sii” 62-65)37—underpin the idea of inherent 
historical and present-day unity of the Rus-
sia-Iran nexus against the third-party forc-
es in the region and worldwide. The char-
acter of the used sources is also 
noteworthy. Solely drawing on either Ira-
nian or Russian primary and secondary 
sources, the above-mentioned works 
completely ignore sources originated in 
third countries. Even in the most recent 
edited collection, Iran: Istoriia i sovremen-
nost’ (“Iran: History and Modernity”), 
which is immensely interesting in terms of 
the diversity of topics discussed, the works 
authored by scholars possessing full com-
mand of English in the book section “The 
Present” do not engage with the relevant 
literature or primary sources from other 
countries (Kulagina and Mamedova).
With regard to the Russian case of the 
long twentieth century, the issue of politi-
cizing historiography is not new. Its re-
sumption during the course of the hectic 
pursuit of the ‘expedient’ national identity 
in the 2000s was studied in detail in Hans 
Bagger’s timely work that, having been 
published in 2007, in fact predicted the 
further development of “Putin’s humani-
ties,” particularly within the walls of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences (Bagger). 
Simultaneously, it, certainly should be not-
ed that in any country, Iranian studies as a 
scholarly domain does not consist only of 
the experts of Iranian contemporary his-
tory and politics. In germano- and russo-
phone countries this domain is much 
more organizationally united and homo-
geneous at the institutional level in com-
parison with their anglophone analogues 
(Fragner and Matthee). A leading Russian 
Iranist-linguist, Professor Vladimir Ivanov, 
denotes the domain of Iranian studies in a 
broad sense as 
a complex of humanities which study 
the mode of life, history, literature (folk-
lore), material and spiritual culture, mu-
sic and singing, written artefacts (man-
uscripts, rock inscriptions), religion and 
beliefs, socio-political situation, econo-
my and languages of the iranophone 
peoples (V. Ivanov 35)
and in a narrow sense, as “the study of the 
above-mentioned disciplines specifically 
in application to Iran” (35). While the Fou-
cauldian concept of power relations ap-
plies to all representatives of the whole 
domain defined above, the power/knowl-
edge nexus is more straightforward and 
can potentially be highlighted in more 
precise colors in the case of those working 
on the modern and contemporary issues 
of Iranian politics, economy and culture. 
This is particularly justified under the cur-
rent conditions of inaccessibility to archi-
val documents related to contemporary 
institutional activities. Hence the emphasis 
of the given study of the post-Soviet 
Iranology has been on this particular 
group within the Moscow Institute of Ori-
ental Studies of the Academy of Sciences 
as embedded into present-day Russia’s 
power/knowledge nexus with greater in-
tensity. 
Conclusion
Thus, when analyzing Russia’s Iranian stud-
ies scholarship during late Imperial, Soviet 
and post-Soviet periods, it appears that 
there has been a common and mainly un-
derlying discourse throughout all three 
periods. Regardless of whether it was con-
scious or unconscious, Russian Iranists 
have been seeing their scholarship in a 
tight concurrence with their own country’s 
interests. The representation of such inter-
ests is conventionally usurped by the po-
litical institutions of the ruling power—the 
status quo that eventually results in the in-
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strumental use of knowledge in the inter-
ests of current state power, as is also sup-
ported by Alexander Morrison (629). 
In further rebuttal of Engelstein’s thesis, 
it is also feasible to conclude that “opera-
tional autonomy” in its Western form was 
not that developed in Russia, especially 
in the Soviet Union since the end of the 
1920s, but as such it existed nonetheless 
with the disciplinary mechanisms of self-
control and self-regulation being of a dif-
ferent kind (A. Vucinich, Empire of Knowl-
edge 123; Krementsov 31-36; Beer 207; 
Kotkin 23). Moreover, the power/knowl-
edge nexus, which definitely existed in 
the Russian case, had its specificities and 
its unique sophistication within late Im-
perial Russia’s Oriental studies and even 
during the Soviet period. Soviet scientists 
and scholars would act not only under the 
pressure of various discursive and ideo-
logical stipulations, imposed by the party 
and creatively developed by some of their 
ideologically driven colleagues, but also 
under the vigilant control of special insti-
tutional structures (from the party com-
mittees—partkomy—in workplaces to the 
monitoring by political security entities—
VCheKa-KGB).38 However, in spite of all 
this, scientists and scholars also managed 
to play their own game. 
While it was considered important to 
protect oneself as much as possible 
against ideological attack from philos-
ophers or professional competitors, it 
was also recognized that party approv-
al did not in fact depend ultimately on 
ideological factors, but rather on the 
ability of scientists to play politics… 
(Fortescue 18) 
Notwithstanding the lack of totality and 
comprehensiveness of the analysis the 
post-Soviet period in terms of sources and 
groups studied in this article, it appears 
that during the period in question, along 
with the significant diversification of po-
litical forces on the scene, the interplay of 
power/knowledge relations became more 
entangled and intense.
Irrespective of the issue of the level of “in-
dividual operational autonomy,” Foucault 
was particularly interested in power rela-
tions and how they influenced the devel-
opment of knowledge. As it appears, 
these power relations and their productive 
impact can be equally found at work in 
late Imperial, Soviet and post-Soviet soci-
eties. The technicalities of the power/
knowledge operation, embracing dis-
courses, institutional practices, resistance, 
and the relationships between state pow-
er and the intellectual—all these elements, 
in other words, the components of the 
Foucauldian ‘power relations grid’ (Fou-
cault, “Truth and Power” 113-14; Kotkin 21-
23)—can easily be seen in the Russian case. 
However, what is most surprising in the 
present-day Russian case is that the Fou-
cauldian methodological approach has 
not yet been employed or even studied in 
Russian social sciences and humanities as 
a theoretical tool. Though the above-men-
tioned refutes, in its essence, Engelstein’s 
thesis on the non-applicability of the Fou-
cauldian to Russia, it is nevertheless perti-
nent to quote her in a slightly supplement-
ed form in the end, saying that, for certain, 
in the field of humanities, “Russia is a soci-
ety that has yet to generate the luxury of a 
Michel Foucault to push it to consider the 
incitements of paradox” (“Combined Un-
derdevelopment” 236).
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5 In brief, it can be defined 
as analyzing scientific and 
scholarly notions and the 
process of their production 
in the social context of a 
particular historical period 
within a certain society.
6 For the debates on the 
feasibility of application 
of Foucauldian ideas and 
notions to the Russian case 
see Beer 3-8, 16-26, 202-08; 
Kotkin 21-23; Engelstein.
7 In the first instance, such 
scholars can be named 
among them as Nikolai 
Krementsov, Loren Graham, 
Alexander Vucinich, Vera 
Tolz, Michael Kemper, Daniel 
Beer, Peter Kneen, Nathaniel 
Knight, Stephen Kotkin, 
Jeffrey Roberg, Stephen 
Fortescue, Francine Hirsch, 
Ilya Gerasimov, Vadim 
Birstein, Yurii Slezkine and 
others.
8 In order to avoid the 
unnecessary Saidian 
connotation and to preserve 
the neutral epistemological 
denotation of the term, I 
henceforth am using the 
noun Orientologist and the 
adjective Orientological 
throughout the piece, 
similarly to Tolz and 
Schimmelpenninck.
9 The Archive of 
Orientologists (IVAN in St. 
Petersburg) (henceforth 
AV), f. 134 (Private archive 
of Minorskii); f. 115 (Private 
archive of Snesarev); The 
Georgian National Centre 
of Manuscripts, f. 39 (Private 
archive of Smirnov); Russia’s 
State Military Historical 
Archive (henceforth RGVIA), 
f. 409, op. 1, d. 172812, p/s 
148-610 (Service Record of 
Tumaskii); The Archive of 
Foreign Policy of the Russian 
Empire (henceforth AVPRI), f. 
Central Asian Desk, op. 485, 
d. 706, l. 1-3 (Argiropulo to 
Gartvig about Miller, 1902).
10 The Russo-Persian Treaty of 
Friendship, 1921, Article 15. 
<http://en.vionto.com/show/
me/Russo-Persian+Treaty+of
+Friendship+(1921)> (12 Mar. 
2013).
11 AVPRI, f. Persian Desk (1915), 
op. 486, d. 156, l. 7, 9 (Reports 




1 This research was supported 
by BRISMES, BIPS, CEELBAS 
and BASEES. The earlier 
version of this paper was 
presented at the ASMEA 
Sixth Annual Conference, 
Washington, DC, 21-23 
November 2013.
2 The author defines 
Russia’s long twentieth 
century between Nicholas II 
ascension in 1894 and the 
annexation of the Crimea in 
2014.
3 In this context, the names 
of such prominent scholars 
(who this or that way touched 
upon these issues) as 
Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), 
Jacques Lacan (1901-1981), 
Louis Althusser (1918-1990), 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), 
Simone de Beauvoir (1908-
1986), Martin Heidegger 
(1889-1976) are worth 
mentioning.
4 See the works by Michel 
Foucault such as The Order 
of Things; The Archaeology 
of Knowledge; “Prison Talk.” 
16 AV, f. 17, op. 2, d.50; d. 34; 
d. 29; f. 17, op. 2, 64; op. 1, 
d. 168. See also Bartol’d, 
“Istoriia izucheniia Vostoka” 
446; Marshall 24, 164-65, 168; 
Vigasin 128-29.
17 Konstantin Ivanovich 
Chaikin (1889-1938), 
Zhukovskii’s disciple, 
graduated from the St. 
Petersburg Faculty of 
Oriental studies in 1916. In 
the 1920s-1930s he worked 
in early Soviet various 
Orientological institutions 
as an academic. The then 
‘spokesmen’ of Soviet Iranian 
studies, Evgeny Bertels 
(1890-1957), would criticize 
Chaikin for “being under 
the influence of Western-
European science and for 
using its methodology.” 
Shortly after, Chaikin was 
executed as a foreign spy in 
1938. GARF, f. 7668, op. 1, d. 
2889, l. 2-3ob. 
18 In 1920 Yakov Bliumkin 
was preparing to become in 
charge of the Cheka in the 
would-be Soviet Socialist 
Republic of Persia. RGASPI, 
f. 85 “Secret Persia,” d. 26, l. 
1. See also Simbirtsev 95-96; 
Marshall 191.
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12 Russia’s State Archive 
of Socio-Political History 
(henceforth RGASPI), f. 
85 “Secret Persia,” d. 63 
(Materials on Soviet trade 
with Persia); f. 532, d. 350, 
l. 11 (data on economic 
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Representations).
13 The People’s Commissariat 
for Foreign Affairs; Military 
Intelligence; the Foreign 
Section of the United State 
Political Directorate (political 
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14 The Archive of Foreign 
Policy of the Russian 
Federation (henceforth 
AVPRF), f. 08 “The Secret 
Archive of NKID. Karakhan,” 
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(Snesarev’s Report to the 
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95ob.; d. 6, l. 119, 142. 
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21 AV, f. 115, op. 1, d. 70 
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